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 Abstract 
The aim of this master thesis is to investigate if WTO members' shifting 
behaviour in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism may be explained using a game 
theoretic approach. 
To do this, the author uses a three step process: First, a thorough quantitative 
analysis of how the DSM works and how the members behave in it is carried out. 
Second, with the result from the first part in mind, a game theoretic model 
pointing out different possible strategies that may be pursued in the DSM is 
constructed. And third, the implications of the model are compared with the 
findings in the first part in order to evaluate whether the model could be used to 
explain the members’ different behaviour in the DSM or not. 
The main result is that many aspects of the member states’ strategies could be 
explained whit the constructed model but as a few commonly used strategies seem 
completely irrational from the model’s perspective it is far from a perfect 
explanation. 
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 List of abbreviations and denotations 
Abbreviations 
 
DSB Dispute Settlement Body 
DSM Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding 
GATT General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
H High income countries 
L Low income countries 
LM Lower Middle income countries 
UM Upper Middle income countries 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
 
 
Denotations 
 
A Appellate Body 
C Complainant 
  The economic value that the complainant loses because of the 
respondent’s measure (and accordingly the amount that the 
complainant demand of the respondent) 
c
d   The dispute cost, namely the economic value of what the 
dispute costs (wages, flights, material etc) for each party in 
each turn of the dispute process 
    The discount off the complainant’s losses that may be 
negotiated during the consultations 
n
P Panel 
p  The probability that a case is a “good case” 
R Respondent 
  The economic value that the respondent gains because of his 
measure (does not need to be the same as  as the illicit measure 
may invoke additional gains or losses for the respondent or 
may be used against more than the complainant country) 
r
  The number of turns in the dispute process x
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 1 Introduction 
In 1995 the World Trade Organisation (WTO) replaced the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which had been in place since 1948 
with the mission to ease world trade. Both institutions stipulate (or stipulated) 
how international trade should be conducted by the member states. When any 
member believes that these agreements are violated in any sense by another 
member, it is useful to have an institution that takes care of the upcoming 
disputes. Therefore there has always existed a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM)1 which the members are supposed to use when such a dispute occur. 
With the birth of the WTO, a new such mechanism replaced the old one and 
has to this day received 373 formal complaints (WTO, 2008a). However, 
members’ use of, and behaviour in, this institution differs in many ways. 
These differences are the focus of the thesis. 
1.1 Statement of purpose 
To find out how and why these differences occur, the thesis turns to game 
theory:  
Could a game theoretic approach be used to explain WTO members' shifting 
behaviour in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism?  
The thesis tries to answer this question. 
1.2 Method 
In order to answer the research question, a method consisting of three 
different parts is used: 
First, a thorough quantitative analysis of how the DSM works and how 
the members behave in it is carried out. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
1 The label Dispute Settlement Mechanism is not used by the WTO itself but indeed by many scholars 
studying this phenomenon (see for example Srinivasan 2007: p1034).  
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 Second, with the result from the first part in mind, a game theoretic model 
lining out different possible strategies that may be pursued in the DSM is 
constructed  
And third, the implications of the model are compared with the findings 
in the first part in order to evaluate whether the model is able to explain the 
members’ different behaviour in the DSM.  
1.3 Delimitations 
Since the object of the study is to find patterns in the member states’ 
behaviour it is of importance to find similarities and dissimilarities among the 
disputes. Unfortunately, it is impossible to account for all such aspects. 
Partly, the theoretical framework used denies the involvement of a lot of 
aspects as it counteract with its notion of simplicity and predictability. And 
partly, it was not possible to find as much detailed information about the 
disputes as had been desired. Hence, the study only treats the most obvious 
aspects of the DSM. 
Therefore, the thesis has no generalising ambitions concerning the use of 
game theory in DSM studies. The results may of course point in one or the 
other direction but to reach conclusions, more studies using those aspects of 
the DSM, as well as game theory that was not used in this thesis, have to be 
conducted. 
1.4 Previous research 
Many scholars have studied the DSM since its birth in 1995 in one or the 
other way.2 It is however difficult to get an overview of all different aspects 
that have been treated but – at least in political science – generally all studies 
falls in one of two categories:  Either you have a top-bottom approach and 
examine what effects the DSM have on the political scene (domestically and 
internationally) or you have a bottom-top approach and examine how 
different actors relate to the DSM. This thesis treats the latter. More 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2 Some scholars actually seem to have done nothing else since then, for example Leitner – Lester have 
published one statistical review of the DSM each year since its founding. See for example the last one: 
Leitner –  Simon, 2007. 
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 specifically, it only treats the member states’ behaviour in the DSM and how 
and why this may differ.  
Nevertheless, quite a few studies with partly the same object have been 
made. Most of those try to explain different behaviour from economical 
factors. For example, it has been found that the value of the contested 
measure influences a country’s choice to complain or not (Bown 2005). In 
fact it has been proven that countries with smaller GDP file fewer complaints 
than those with bigger, probably because the values of the disputes are lower 
(Busch – Reinhardt 2003). Bown – Hoekman (2005) made a similar statement 
when they showed that small importers complain more seldom because they 
know that an import restricting retaliation would not affect a rich country. 
Also, it seems that a country files most of its complaints concerning the 
industries where they have the domestically most powerful lobbyists (Davis – 
Shirato 2007). 
The few studies also concerning non economic sides of the process have 
proposed that developing countries not file against developed because they 
are reliant on the latter for development assistance (Zejan – Bartels 2006: 
p1022). Conti (2008) tried in a recent study to show that motives for filing 
may be political or symbolic as well as economical. And not least, Busch – 
Reinhardt (2006) have shown that if a third party exist in a dispute, this lower 
the prospects for early settlement. 
From the example above we can conclude that the existing literature in 
the field has a bias toward a discussion of why a country file a complaint in 
the first place, while very few discuss how countries behave inside the DSM. 
 
When the scope is reduced to game theoretic studies of the DSM the number 
of studies decreases drastically. This fact may have several explanations but 
two of the most important should be: 
? Game theory is regarded with great suspicion in big parts of the 
field of political science. Hence, many scholars refuse to concern 
themselves with game theoretic analysis at all (Ordeshook 1986: 
px). 
? If game theory is used in political science, it is most commonly 
applied to domestic politics like voting or elections. When applied 
to international politics, most studies have concerned the prospects 
for peace and war as most realist scholars for a long time were 
much more interested in “real” political conflicts than economical 
ones (Morrow 1994: p3). 
There does not seem to be any study – concerning the participants’ behaviour 
– made using a completely game theoretic framework. Rosendorff (2005) has 
used a game theoretic model to investigate how the existence of a DSM in a 
trade agreement (such as the one in WTO) affect the trade agreement itself 
and Grinols – Perrelli (2006) conducted a similar study in order to investigate 
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 how the design of DSMs affects the frequency and number of trade disputes. 
As these studies concern the same kind of institution, some of the 
assumptions and intuitions may apply to this study but the appliance and the 
implications differ. 
1.5 Disposition 
The thesis is divided into seven main chapters. Next chapter describes the 
methods and material used in the study in more detail, as well as important 
definitions and operationalizations. Chapter 3 concludes the theoretical 
framework while chapter 4 gives a more thorough explanation of how the 
DSM works and is being used. The game theoretic model is then constructed 
and analysed in chapter 5 and compared with the findings from chapter 4 in 
chapter 6. Conclusions are made in chapter 7. 
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 2 Methods and material 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Quantitative analysis 
Even though the main object of this study is to construct and use a game 
theoretic model, a minor quantitative analysis of the complaints brought to 
the DSM have been conducted. The reason for this procedure was twofold: 
First, in order to develop a model of an existent phenomenon – and even 
more important: to know what to use this model for – you have to have some 
basic knowledge about what characteristics this phenomenon has. Only then 
it is possible to build a model that at least has the potential to correspond with 
reality.  
Second, to be able to judge whether the implications of the constructed 
model correspond with the reality – and thus determine if the WTO member 
states act in a way consistent with what the game theoretic model implies – it 
needs to be compared with the reality. And once again the result of the 
quantitative analysis can be used to tell if it holds for such a comparison. 
 
The 324 disputes that were taken by the member states to the DSM between 1 
January 1995 and 31 December 2004 were individually examined and 
categorised using WTO:s own dispute summaries. The data was compiled 
and analyzed using the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences), a 
computer program designed for statistical analysis.  
However, no really technical feature that should need any extra 
explanation was used. The analysis only involves simple measures like 
means, distributions and percents. The relevant results are presented in part 
4.2. 
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 2.1.2 Game theoretic analysis 
In game theory, different possibilities and what they may entail in each 
situation are of main importance. Therefore a simplified model of all possible 
moves and outcomes of the DSM process was constructed as a first step. 
Next, an assessment of what each move and outcome could imply for the 
involved players (that is to say member states) was carried out.  
With all basic parts and assumptions in place, the model could then be 
analysed and expanded: Possible outcomes were evaluated, the expected best 
moves for each player were revealed, and theoretic assumptions were added 
and removed. All of these may be found in chapter 5 while the implications 
of the model and how those correspond with reality are presented in chapter 
6. 
2.2 Material 
As mentioned above many studies investigating the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism have been done and not a few of them have had a statistical 
approach. Thus the disputes have been heavily analyzed and extensive sets of 
statistical data should exist in many scientists’ computers all over the world. 
However, the interest of sharing these datasets freely seems to be much more 
modest. It has been impossible to find an existing set of data concerning the 
issues treated in this thesis. 
The sole option was therefore to turn to the WTO itself and from the 
information supplied on the website (WTO 2008a) complete a new dataset. 
The WTO provides a complete list of cases where the characteristics and the 
events of each dispute are more or less extensively summarized. This list was 
used to collect a few interesting features of every dispute set off during the 
first ten years of the DSM. Additional information about the states in question 
that could not be found on the WTO website was collected from the World 
Bank website (World Bank 2008a). 
As data collecting was not the main purpose of the thesis, only a limited 
amount of time could be spent on this task and therefore the data collected 
could not be as extensive as desired. For a study of this magnitude it has 
nevertheless been satisfactory. 
2.3 Definitions and operationalizations 
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 2.3.1 Time period 
As mentioned above, this thesis studies all disputes taken to the DSM 
between 1995 and 2004. This period of time has been chosen for two main 
reasons. Firstly, as WTO (and at the same time the DSM) was launched 1 
January 1995 it consists of a neat period of the first ten years of the DSM in 
action. And secondly, virtually all cases filed during this period have, up to 
this date, in one or the other way been settled or dismissed. This means that 
the statistical analysis is not flawed with a big number of cases where the 
outcome is still uncertain, which then would have jeopardised the final result. 
2.3.2 Member states 
All states that were or became a member in the WTO during the examined 
period have been included in the study, this counts for all of the now 151 
member states except three (Saudi Arabia, Viet Nam and Tonga). As 
members of the European Union participate in the WTO as the European 
Communities (even if they also are individual members), all members 
accessed before the enlargement in May 2004 are excluded from the study. 
Hence, in total, 133 members are represented (WTO 2008b). 
The fact that countries that only have been members for a few years still 
are included may produce a little bias towards inactive countries: There could 
be rational explanations to why a state proceeds more cautiously during its 
first years of membership than mature members do which implies that those 
countries should be removed from the study. But then there would be an even 
more delicate problem to point out which countries to remove and which to 
keep. If only countries that have been members since the start would qualify, 
the study would end up with a too small case population. On the whole, it 
therefore seems better to include all members. 
 
2.3.3 Country categories 
To test whether a country’s development status affects its behaviour in the 
DSM each of the WTO member countries must be classified as either 
developed or developing. To do this, the World Bank’s classification, based 
on GNP/capita, is used. This is partly because it is the most commonly used 
classification (Todaro – Smith 2003: p34) and partly because it seems most 
appropriate to use an economic classification as the study mostly treats 
economic costs and gains.  
 10
 The Bank presents yearly the GNP/capita for almost every economy of 
the world (including all of the 133 WTO members used in this study) and 
classifies them, using these figures, into four different categories. The 
wealthiest rank as High income countries , the next group as Upper 
middle income countries , the second poorest group as Lower middle 
income countries and the poorest as Low income countries  (Todaro 
– Smith 2003: p34). In this study, all countries are considered developing 
countries except those ranked as High income countries. Some times, in order 
to get an even more detailed comparison all the four subgroups are also used. 
)(H
)(UM
)(LM )(L
As the study covers a time period of ten years and the World Bank 
presents a new ranking every year it is possible for a country to shift between 
several different country classes. To be able to summarize all disputes in an 
effective way each country however need to be grouped into only one class. 
For that reason, the countries that have been shifting between categories have 
been grouped into the category they have belonged to most of the ten years. 
2.3.4 Issue categories 
To be able to find some common feature for the different disputes they where 
categorized by what issue each dispute concerned. Five different – mutually 
exclusive – categories were used: 
? Natural resources 
? Agricultural products 
? Manufactures 
? Services 
? Horizontal issues 
All of them are quite straightforward and should not need any further 
explanation except the Horizontal issues. Those are issues that can not be 
referred to a particular industry but concerns more general policy issues like 
tax codes or general domestic law (Davis – Shirato 2007: p285).  
Of course all of these categories could have been divided in more specific 
subcategories but it has to be questioned what use a general and simplifying 
study would have of ten or more specialized categories. The big picture and 
possible existing tendencies would risk vanishing in a multitude of details. 
The reliability with such a large amount of categories would also diminish as 
the uncertainty about to what category a specific dispute belongs would 
increase. 
2.3.5 Disputes and cases 
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 During the ten years observed in this study a total of 324 disputes were taken 
to the DSM by the members. It is however not unusual that several member 
states start one dispute each concerning one country’s specific measure. In 
such a case, when several disputes concern the same question, further 
negotiations and eventual panel establishments are done collectively. Thus 
several disputes may be treated as only one case. In the same way it is 
possible for involved countries to treat a number of disputes closely related as 
only one, also resulting in several disputes becoming only one case.  
To not blur the analysis these unnatural disputes must all be adjusted. 
Partly because some disputes otherwise may seem to end abruptly without 
any form of settlement when in fact the dispute was solved together with 
another one. And partly because if one or more countries have started 
multiple disputes concerning one other country’s measure it would create an 
unnatural bias if those would count as more than one case. When the data set 
were corrected for all these kind of anomalies the 324 disputes decreased to 
261 cases. 
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 3 Theory 
 
3.1 Game theory 
The field of game theory was more or less invented by Neumann – 
Morgenstern when they released their book Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior in 1944. Only a few years later the literature flourished and it did 
not take long before the use of game theory was extended to other social 
sciences, including political science (Brams 1975: pxi). Most of the theory 
described below dates from its heydays in the 50s and 60s as its formal usage 
in political science has declined ever since. However, many important 
theories developed in recent years have their roots in game theory (e.g. 
Putnam’s two-level game model) (Morrow 1994: p2-3, p187). 
Game theory could be seen as a subcategory to rational choice theory as 
they share the key beliefs of the state of the world, such as a rather positivistic 
epistemology and the assumption of rational actors (Brams 1975:pxii; Hay 
2002: p8). The primary advantage of these theories is that they reduce real 
world phenomena to simple models that then could be thoroughly analysed. 
Even if the real world looks a lot more complex than a simple game theoretic 
model, game theory may nevertheless contribute to the understanding of 
political events because it forces the researcher to focus on a few aspects that 
are believed to be the most relevant, while neglecting the rest (Morrow 1994: 
p6-7). This is exactly what has been done in this study and below, the 
relevant parts of the approach are briefly explained. 
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 3.2 Theoretical assumptions and models 
3.2.1 Rational actors 
As the theory have clear predictive objectives the actors – whose actions we 
want to predict – must behave rationally (Hay 2002, p8-9). The concept of 
rationality is quite contested (Brams 1975, pxv) but it all boils down to a 
rather simple assumption. For example, Morrow puts it as “rational behaviour 
means choosing the best means to gain a predetermined set of ends” (1994: 
p17). This does thus mean that rational actors have specified goals and 
always choose the action that they believe will best attain those goals. 
Prolonged, this implies that they can rank all the possible outcomes according 
to their preferences (complete preferences) and that they always act in 
consistence with that ranking (if and ,then ) (transitive 
preferences). Preferences that are both complete and transitive are called 
ordinal as all of the outcomes then are possible to order (Morrow 1994, p17-
18). 
ba > cb > ca >
To use these conceptions of rationality practically the players’ preferences 
are assumed to be fixed. That is to say that each time the actors are given the 
same options (resulting in the same outcomes) they always choose the same 
action (Morrow 1994, p17).  
3.2.2 Simplicity 
It is often impossible to predict all possible outcomes in a specific situation 
and even if they all were predicted, a model with all these possible outcomes 
spelled out would be extremely complicated. Hence, to be able to use game 
theory at all on real world phenomena, another feature is important, and that 
is simplification. To make a model fruitful and cogent the essence of a real 
world situation must be captured while everything else is ignored. The 
simplifications used to do this can then be judged by the accuracy of the 
implications of the model. If the model’s implications correspond with the 
behaviour in the real world the simplifications are probably justified, if not 
they are either false or have missed out some important aspects (Morrow 
1994: p6-7). 
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 3.2.3 Utility 
As ordinal preferences can be ordered they may also be assigned values that 
are consistent with that order, such a value is called a utility. A function that 
shows what utility each choice has (or is expected to have) is called a utility 
function (Morrow 1994, p18). 
If it is not known that an action certainly may produce an outcome the 
player must take the probabilities of the different possible outcomes to 
account (Morrow 1994, p24). The expected utility for an action ( )a can be said 
to be the product of the utility of each outcome ( )o times the probability of 
that outcome ( given the action summed across all outcomes. Algebraically 
this is written 
)p
( ) nn opopopau ×+×+×= ...2211 . 
3.2.4 Different types of games 
If – for each possible outcome in a game – one player’s gain equals the other 
player’s loss, the game is denoted a zero-sum game. It is impossible for one 
player to win more than the other loses. Alternatively, if a game is played 
without such a common stake it is denoted a non-zero-sum game. In such a 
game one player’s utility does not need to have anything to do with the 
others’, this also means that a game may result in either gains or losses for all 
players. As zero-sum games relate badly to most real world situations all 
games in the thesis are assumed to be non-zero-sum games (Morrow 1994: 
p74-75). 
A non-zero-sum game could also be divided into two subgroups: either 
they are cooperative or they are noncooperative. In a cooperative game, 
players are allowed to make binding agreements during the play. The players’ 
choices thus depend on their utility functions and on potential agreement. In 
noncooperative games, agreements are not an option, each player is always 
free to choose whatever they believe will produce the best outcome (Morrow 
1994: p75-76).  
As the outcomes of cooperative games depend on the agreements 
negotiated between the players it is impossible to say anything about the 
outcomes of such a game without knowing these agreements (and the other 
way around every single strategy played by a player could be explained by 
assuming some sort of agreement) (Morrow 1994: p111). Because of these 
limitations of cooperative games, all games in the thesis are assumed to be 
noncooperative. 
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 3.2.5 Extensive and strategic forms of games 
When modelling a game, usually one of two (or both) different forms is used. 
The most basic form is the extensive form which has the shape of a game tree 
where the whole procedure with all choices and alternatives are sketched out 
(Morrow 1994: p65-66). A simple example of an extensive-form game is 
shown in figure 1. 
A
B
choic
e α
choic
e γ
choice β
choice δ
(3; 4)
(2; 1)
(5; 3)
 
Figure 1. 
 
Each box is a node where a player can make a choice. At the first node 
player αchoice βchoiceA A βmay choose between and . If chooses the game 
ends, illustrated by the dot, and the utility for A Bwill then be3and for it will 
be , often denoted payoffs. If A B chooses 4 α player will have to make a 
choice. The game will then end irrespective of choice, only the payoffs 
will differ. 
sB'
With a game in extensive form, every aspect of the game is shown, but it 
may easily become quite complicated when the number of nodes and choices 
increase (Morrow 1994: p70). Instead, a game can be summarized by the 
possible strategies the players may follow. The game outlined in its extensive 
form in figure 1 is summarized in its strategic form in table 1. 
 
B  
 γchoice δchoice
 
 
( )3;5 ( )1;2αchoice    A  
( )4;3 ( )4;3βchoice    
Table 1. 
 
The players’ possible strategies are given in the table’s rows and columns 
respectively. As one player’s payoff is assumed to depend on the other 
player’s strategy the payoffs of different strategies are shown where one of 
player and one of player strategies intersect. In the example this is true 
as long as player
sA' sB'
A choosesα but if A choosesβ ,  strategy no longer 
matter. However, the payoffs are spelled out anyway because even if 
sB'
B is not 
given the option to choose he still may have decided for a strategy (Morrow 
1994: p66).  
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 3.2.6 Backwards induction 
When a game is written in extensive form the players’ strategies may be 
predicted using backwards induction. By beginning with the end nodes of the 
game and constantly define each players optimal move until the first node is 
reached the preferred (and thus used) strategies are revealed (Morrow 1994: 
p124-125). 
3.2.7 Best replies and Nash equilibriums 
Modelled in its strategic form, a game’s best strategies for the different 
players are easy to find. If we for example assume that A choosesα in table 1 
we easily conclude that  best reply issB' γ . That one player’s strategy is the 
best reply for another player’s is generally expressed as ( ) ( )jji sSPsSP ;; ≥  
where P denotes a payoff; first player’s strategies; andS s second player’s 
strategies (see table 2). The above expression thus means that there is no 
strategy that gives a better payoff for player 1 than  given that 
player plays . 
iS
js2
)2(playerSecond  
 is  js  
iS  ( )ii sSP ;  ( )ji sSP ;  )1(player
First
 
( )ij sSP ; ( )jj sSP ;jS   
Table 2. 
 
When the whole game is examined in a similar manner, we find every 
strategy’s best reply. If (and only if) it turns out that a pair of strategies are 
best replies to each other they form a Nash equilibrium. To show this 
algebraically, the following two equations must be fulfilled: ( ) ( ) ijji SSallforsSPsSP ≠≥ ;; 11 , ( ) ( ) jiji ssallforsSPsSP ≠≥ ;; 22 . 
For the game in table 2, there exist two such Nash equilibriums: ( )γα;P ( )δβ ;Pand . 
As each player’s strategy is the best reply to the other’s no player would 
ever choose to change his strategy once in a Nash equilibrium. This also 
means that, if we assume complete information (that all players know all 
payoffs), rational players would only play strategies resulting in Nash 
equilibriums (Morrow 1994: p98). If a game contains several Nash 
equilibriums the first player will choose the strategy that leads to his most 
preferred Nash equilibrium. In table 1 player A knows that the game will end 
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 ( )γα;Pin one of the two equilibriums and as he prefers the Nash equilibrium  
he will chooseα . 
3.2.8 Different kinds of information 
In the example in figure 1 above the players have perfect information about 
the game. This means that all players know exactly how the game looks and 
on which node they are when it is their turn to choose. However, if B has to 
choose without knowing where in the game tree he is (even if it is easy to 
guess in the example as B  only have one node) the information is imperfect 
(Morrow 1994: p63-64). Imperfect information usually implies that a player 
needs to estimate probability distributions concerning which node it may be 
on and for the possible outcomes of its choices (figure 4 in chapter 5 
represent this type of game) (Morrow 1994: p56). 
But even if a game is played under imperfect information, it is assumed 
that all players in a game know all the possible payoffs. This means that B  
still knows all the payoffs shown in table 1. As long as this is true, the 
information is complete. If this is not true (and, for example, B does not know 
what payoffs A may get from choicesγ andδ ) the information in the game is 
incomplete (Morrow 1994: p63-64). 
3.2.9 The Rubinstein Bargaining Model 
Game theory is often applied to bargaining situations (and this thesis is no 
exception) where the players try to reach a mutual acceptable solution. If this 
bargaining is held under complete information all players’ utilities are 
supposed to be known from the start, implying that everybody knows which 
outcome one player prefers over another. And if this is the case, there is no 
need for bargaining at all as it is possible to trace the optimal mutual 
acceptable solution at once. 
Hence, if there exists an agreement acceptable to everybody we may say 
directly what the agreement will be, and this agreement will be offered by the 
first player in the first round of the negotiation. The intuition behind this 
reasoning is called the Rubinstein Bargaining Model (Morrow 1994: p145-
149). 
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 4 Background 
4.1 How does the DSM work? 
When a WTO member state believes that it is deprived of benefits because 
another member violates any of the WTO agreements it has three choices. 
Either it does nothing; either it contacts the violating country and try to solve 
the problem bilaterally; or it complains to the WTO. It is when a country 
chooses the third option that the case lands up in the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism.  
How the DSM functions/works is spelled out in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) – a treaty negotiated during the Uruguay round – and 
covers all disputes arising in the WTO. The rules and the proceedings are 
described rather strictly with a clear framework that each dispute need to 
follow. This procedure may be summarized in the steps below: 
1. When a complaint is made to the WTO the disputing parties first 
have to try to solve the conflict through consultations. During this 
stage the WTO offers the parties mediation to ease the 
negotiations.  
2. After at least 60 days of consultation, the complainant may 
request the establishment of a panel if no solution has been found. 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) – a part of the WTO council 
– then appoints a panel consisting of three individuals. These three 
are chosen from an existing list of trade policy experts (WTO 
diplomats, civil servants and academics) suggested by all the 
member states. The panel then have six months to hear the 
disputing parties, examine the facts and to come to a conclusion. 
The conclusions are released in a report which specifies if and in 
what way the respondent has violated the WTO agreements or not.  
3. Both parties have the right to appeal the panel report if they think 
that the panel has interpreted the relevant agreements incorrectly. 
If either party does this, three of the seven permanent members of 
the Appellate Body have 90 days to examine the case and verify if 
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 the panel report is correct. The Appellate Body’s decision is then 
released in a new report.  
4. If, after the three steps above, the respondent is found guilty, he is 
recommended to correct his measures in “a reasonable period of 
time” which may be determined by the DSB. If the complainant is 
not pleased with the implementation of the corrections, he has two 
choices. Either he reports the disobedience to the DSB, which 
means that the question of implementation is treated in the same 
way as the original complaint was in step 2-4. Or he asks the 
Appellate Body of permission to start retaliation measures against 
the respondent which are supposed to neutralize the effects of the 
illicit measures. Thus, if the complaint is approved, the 
complainant is supposed to always be compensated whether the 
respondent complies or not. 
(Hoekman – Kostecki 2001: p76-77; Seth 2004: p81-105) 
 
4.2 How do the countries act? A quantitative 
analysis  
To be able to construct an accurate model – and later to investigate how well 
the model correspond with reality – we need a little more information about 
the disputes, these are compiled below. 
First of all, most members have not had to care about these rules at all, as 
they have never participated in a dispute as either complainant or respondent 
(see table 3). It is also obvious that the extent of countries that participate 
decreases in line with their GNP/capita. This result is line with the fact that 
developed countries only account for one third of the total complaints. 
From table 3 we can also tell that it is more common to participate as 
complainant than as respondent which indicate that there are more countries 
that voluntarily start a case than there are countries that involuntarily end up 
in one.  
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 35% 52% 32% 22% 9%
21% 26% 20% 15% 7%
30% 52% 26% 18% 9%
26% 26% 26% 18% 7%
Participated in at least one
dispute
Participated as both
complainant and respondent
Participated as complainant
Participated as respondent
133
member
states
All
countries
23
member
states
Developed
countries
110
member
states
All
developing
countries
82
member
states
Developing
countries
classified
as LM or L
46
member
states
Developing
countries
classified
as L
 
Table 3. Participation 
 
When it comes to what kind of issues that are most disputed the distribution 
follows in table 4. This corresponds reasonably well to the different sectors of 
world trade (even if the horizontal issues are non-measurable) except for 
natural resources and services, those account for much more than one 
respectively two percent of the world trade today (World Bank 2008b).  
 
78 30
67 26
106 41
4 1
6 2
261 100
Agricultural products
Horizontal issues
Manufactures
Natural resources
Services
Total
Frequency Percent
 
Table 4. Issue categories 
 
When it concerns the countries that have taken part in at least one case, the 
result looks like in table 5. It is a little discouraging that only less than a 
quarter of the cases reach an end during the consultations but what is most 
surprising is that more than one third of the cases end without any form of 
agreement. It seems logical that when someone files a complaint he wants to 
reach a solution, thus if no settlement is reached the complainant should 
demand the establishment of a panel. But apparently, this is not the case. 
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 59 23
100 38
102 39
261 100
Settlement
No settlement, no panel
Panel established
       Total
Frequency Percent
 
Table 5. Case proceedings 
 
May the proceedings of a case differ depending on what kind of issue that is 
at stake? The answer may be found in the two following tables. In table 6 it is 
shown that most issues have fairly equal case proceedings except the two last 
categories. We should however not pay too much attention to the outstanding 
figures of these two issues as they consist of very small populations. 
Excluding those two, the most interesting findings are that in cases 
concerning manufactures 45% are taken to a panel, and concerning 
agricultural products almost half of them end in nowhere. 
In table 7 it is possible to see if countries of one kind act differently 
depending on which kind of country it is disputing against. This could be said 
to be the most interesting table with several interesting implications: It shows 
clearly that it is much harder to find a settlement when a developing country 
has filed a developed than otherwise. Furthermore, when a developed country 
files a developing there is much less chance that the complainant will desert it 
than usual. Finally, it seems more likely that cases are deserted when both 
parties are of the same kind than if not. 
 
21% 47% 32% 100%
27% 37% 36% 100%
21% 34% 45% 100%
50% 25% 25% 100%
17% 17% 66% 100%
23% 38% 39% 100%
Category
Agricultural products (78 cases)
Horizontal issues   (67 cases)
Manufactures (106 cases)
Natural resources (4 cases)
Services (6 cases)
Total
Settlement
No settlement,
no panel
Panel
established
Case proceedings
     
Total
 
Table 6. Case proceedings for different issues 
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 22% 47% 31% 100%
29% 29% 42% 100%
11% 46% 43% 100%
29% 51% 20% 100%
12% 63% 25% 100%
33% 67% 0% 100%
Case conditions
Complainant = developed
Respondent = developed
(112 cases)
Complainant = developed
Respondent = developing
(45 cases)
Complainant = developing
Respondent = developed
(44 cases)
Complainant = developing
Respondent = developing
(49 cases)
Complainant = both
Respondent = developed
(8 cases)
Complainant = both
Respondent = developing
(3 cases)
Settlement
No settlement,
no panel
Panel
established
Case proceedings
Total
 
Table 7. Case proceedings for different case conditions 
 
Of those cases where a panel is established, most of them seem to be well-
founded. If the cases without a report yet are separated from table 8, more 
than 79% are approved. Seemingly, either the world is full of trade violations; 
or the members choose when to complain about a measure with great 
prudence. 
From table 9 we can also see that most of the panel reports are upheld by 
the Appellate Body when appealed (when the results of table 8 and 9 are put 
together we find that – in total – the complainant is right in 78% of the cases). 
Only 7% of the approved complaints and 27% of the dismissed are rejected 
by the Appellate Body. This indicates that the panel reports are right in a 
large majority of the cases. The obvious question is then why 65 of 102 cases 
nevertheless are appealed. There is no answer to find in the statistics but table 
10 at least gives a detailed picture of the situation. It may seem a little odd 
that complainants have appealed even when the complaint was approved but 
in such a case the appeal concerns some minor part of the complaint that was 
disliked. 
 
76 74
20 20
6 6
102 100
Approved
Dismissed
No report yet
Total
Frequency Percent
 
Table 8. Panel’s judgement 
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50 4 54
8 3 11
58 7 65
Approved
Dismissed
Panel's
judgement
Total
Judgement
upheld
Judgement
rejected
Appelate Body's decision
Total
 
Table 9. Appellate Body’s opinion on Panel’s judgement 
 
 Count
22 3 50 1 76
9 11 0 0 20
31 14 50 1 96
Approved
Dismissed
Panel's
judgement
Total
No appeal
Complainant's
appeal
Respondent's
appeal Appeal by both
Appeal to Appellate Body
Total
 
Table 10. When do the parties appeal and when do they not? 
 
If the respondent is found guilty, the DSU stipulates that he has to comply 
with the judgement. However, only three quarters do this, the others refuse 
(see table 11). When this has been the case, all complainants except one have 
used one of their two possibilities to force the respondent to compliance 
(table 12). 
 
57 76
18 24
75 100
Comply
Not comply
Total
Frequency Percent
 
Table 11. Respondent’s compliance 
 
 
1 6
8 44
7 39
2 11
18 100
Nothing
Implementation appeal
Retaliation
Both
Total
Frequency Percent
 
Table 12. Complainants response to no compliance 
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 5 The model 
5.1 The outline 
Knowing how the DSM is supposed to function according to the DSU as well 
as how all of the 261 cases looked like in reality, it is now time to construct 
an extensive-form game theoretic model, valid for all known possibilities. 
The result of this attempt can be seen in figure 2.  
Each step of this model may of course be contested as the main ambition 
has been to make it as simple as possible, not as accurate as possible. 
Nevertheless it is rather realistic: The procedure of any case may be sketched 
according to this model.  
Each node, and the possible choices an actor can make at each node, is 
reasonably straightforward but a few steps may nonetheless need a little more 
explanation: 
 
? At the second node, where R may choose whether to settle the case or 
not, it is of course not only up to R. This node represents the whole 
consultation process where R and C are supposed to reach a settlement 
on their own. However, as this is bargaining process it can according to 
the Rubinstein Bargaining Model be replaced by one single choice. And 
this choice is R’s as he is to choose whether to give C an acceptable 
offer or not (see part 5.3.2 for a more thorough discussion of what the 
Rubinstein Bargaining Model implies for this game). 
? When a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body’s decision is 
always denoted approved if the decision approves the initial complaint – 
even  if the appeal itself really is dismissed – and vice versa. This 
denotation makes the different choices more comparable and intuitive. 
? The three “end nodes” of the game also look somewhat odd as all of the 
choices do not seem to end the game. And this is entirely true, the 
option implementation appeal is marked with an arrow instead of a dot 
because if C chooses this option the procedure continues with a new 
panel and maybe also an appeal of that panel’s report. Exactly what may 
happen can be seen in figure 3. The reasons to why the rest of the game 
not is outlined in figure 2 are however ridiculously simple:  
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 First, the implementation appeal option involves a whole range of 
new possibilities which together with the rest of the model would not fit 
on one single page. 
Second, according to the basic interpretation of the model it is never 
rational for C to play the implementation appeal option. It seems a bit 
unnecessary to include possibilities that are not plausible in the model. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 2. 
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 5.2 Variables and payoffs 
The possible payoffs from this game model (between brackets after each 
outcome) are assumed to consist of the following variables: 
=c  the economic value that the complainant loses because of the 
respondent’s measure (and accordingly the amount that the complainant 
demand of the respondent) 
=r  the economic value that the respondent gains because of his measure 
(does not need to be the same as as the illicit measure may invoke 
additional gains or losses for the respondent or may be used against more 
than the complainant country) 
c
=n  the discount off the complainant’s losses ( ) that may be negotiated 
during the consultations (
c
cn ≤≤0 ) 
=d  the dispute cost, namely the economic value of what the dispute 
costs (wages, flights, material etc) for each party in each turn of the dispute 
process 
61 ≤≤ x the number of turns in the dispute process (=x but if the 
implementation appellation possibility is left out (as it does not seem 
economically rational) 41 ≤≤ x ) 
10 ≤≤ p=p  the probability that a case is a “good case” ( ) 
 
For each outcome C’s payoff is given before R’s.At the start, C is thought to 
have nothing, while R is thought to have r, thereof the payoffs for the strategy 
let go. If C chooses to proceed in the game, the dispute costs will start to 
accumulate and are never possible to get rid off. As they rise for every part of 
the game that demands new efforts from the disputing parties d’s coefficient 
will rise as well.  
If the parties are able to reach a settlement in the second node, C receives 
the amount he demands minus R’s negotiated discount while R of course 
loses the same amount. If a case instead reaches at least a panel, the player’s 
payoffs depend on the panels’ and the Appelate Body’s reports and R’s 
eventual compliance. If R does not comply, C may take one of two actions, 
either he asks for permission to start countermeasures against R (which are 
supposed to equal C’s loss) or he makes an implementation appeal. He may 
also choose to do nothing. If C chooses the appeal option, he will for certain 
have higher dispute costs than if he had not appealed and it is not certain that 
his appeal will be approved at all. Thus, the strategy to make an 
implementation appeal seems to always be worse than to retaliate.  
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 5.3 Interpretation 
It is more or less impossible to draw any conclusions from the model in figure 
2 as the most important choices are made by P and A, two players that are not 
part of the study. Hence, we need to reduce the game from a four-player to a 
two-player game. 
Luckily, this is easily done by introducing a chance node (Ch). If we start 
by letting chance decide whether the filed complaint is a good or a bad case 
A and P are no longer needed.3 As a matter of fact, chance also decides all 
utilities after a panel has been established except for the total dispute cost. 
This means that the model may be reduced to figure 4 if we denote the 
unknown dispute cost . The broken lines in this figure means that the 
player in a node linked with another one cannot determine which of these two 
nodes it is at when it must choose, but all possible payoffs are still known to 
both players. Hence, the game is played under imperfect but complete 
information. 
xd
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Figure 4. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 Of course there exist no such things as hundred percent good or bad cases in the real world. First of all, 
most panel reports are not completely approving or dismissing but instead they approve some parts of the 
complaint and dismiss other. Nevertheless, when looking at the whole picture it is still possible to say 
which party that won or lost the case. Secondly, no panel report could be said to have access to any eternal 
truths. A report could always be rejected by the Appellate Body or any other expert in the field. But yet it is 
a rather good estimate and the only possible simplification tool at hand. 
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To use this model for predictive purpose the players’ choices must be 
evaluated. This is done below, using the method of backwards induction. 
5.3.1 Node 3 
WhenC is in position to choose to either demand the establishment of a panel 
or not he notice that the choice to not establish a panel always will result in 
the utility function  ( ) dpanelnou −=  
but the choice to establish a panel may result in either  ( ) ( xdcppanelu g −= )  or ( ) ( ) ( )xdppanelu b −×−= 1 . 
Thus the complete utility function for C is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) xdpcpxdxdpxdpcxdpxdcppanelu −=+−−=−×−+−= 1  
As knows that he should establish a panel if the estimated utility function 
for establishing a panel exceeds the utility function for not doing so he will 
demand a panel if 
C
dxdpc −>− . 
However it seems not rational that C  would ever choose the option to not 
demand a panel when the game is played with complete information. Because 
with complete information all utility functions are known in advance 
and should not start a dispute at all if he knew that C d− would be his best 
expected outcome when could do nothing and get . 0
5.3.2 Node 2 
Before choice, the consultations take place. This bargaining process will 
only treat the size of (as it is the only variable that the parties may affect) 
where  would prefer 
sC '
n
C 0=n R Rand . If we assume thatcn = makes the 
offers, he will start by offering  nothing (C cn = ). However,C  will accept 
no offer resulting in a payoff ( dnc −− ) that gives him less than the not settle 
option ( ). This means that only accepts offers 
where . 
xdpc − C
dxdpccn −+−<
RWhen the bargaining process is reaching the end, then has the option to 
giveC an offer that he will accept ( dxdpccn −+−< ) or not. As all facts 
presented above will be known to R when the bargaining process starts, the 
Rubinstein model implies that there will be no real bargaining. At the 
start, R will choose whether to offer an acceptable size of toC or not. And 
then it will be over. 
n
sR' decision will depend on if he prefers the payoff that the settlement 
will produce or the one he will get whenC establish a panel. The latter will 
result in either 
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 ( ) )( xdcrppanelu g −−= ( ) ( xdrppanelu )− or             b ×− )1(= . 
RThe complete utility function for if he chooses not to settle is consequently: 
 
 
 
As we can read from the figure that  utility function for settling with  is 
 
sR' C( ) dncrsettleu −+−=
the decision equation for R at this point is to settle if 
xdpcrdncr −−>−+− (that is to say if dncxdpc +−>+ ); 
otherwise not. 
5.3.3 Node 1 
WhenC chooses whether to complain to the WTO or not he can expect two 
different utility functions:  
If R  wants to settle: u( ) dncsettle −−=  
and if R or not want to settle: ( ) xdpcpanelu −= . 
As complete information is assumed,C  already knows what  strategy 
is and hence his choice is simple: if the relevant function exceeds (which 
will be the outcome if he not complains at all) he should complain, otherwise 
not. 
sR'
0
 
Summarized, this game consists of three simple steps: 
1. complains if the relevant C ( )complainu  ( pc xd− or ) 
exceeds 0 . 
dnc −−
2. R chooses to settle if ( ) ( )settlenotusettleu (> dncxdpc +−>+ ). 
3. demands a panel if C ( ) ( )panelnoupanelu  (> dxdpc −>− ). 
5.3.4 Strategic form 
Of course, the game may also be summarized in its strategic form; this is 
done in table x.x. The model then boils down to six different strategies, with 
four different payoffs.  
 
 R  
Strategies  )(SSettle  )(NsettleNot  
)(, NCpanelnoComplain − ( )dncrdnc −+−−− ; ( )drd −− ;  
)(, PCpanelComplain −  ( )dncrdnc −+−−− ; ( )xdpcrxdpc −−− ;
 
 
 
C  
)(LgoLet  ( )r;0  ( )r;0  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
xdpcrpxdprxdrpxdpcpr
xdrpxdcrppanelupanelusettlenotu bg
−−=+−−+−−
=−= − − ++= 1− ×
=
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 5.3.5 Nash equilibriums 
But which of these strategies may be rational? Even if the values of the 
payoffs are not known, those choices that possibly could be Nash equilibria 
may be solved algebraically. It turns out that four of the six possible 
outcomes are potential Nash equilibria (to see how this was calculated, see 
Appendix A). These are: 
?  SPC ;−
?  NPC ;−
?  SL;
?  NL;
Thus, rational players with complete information should end up in one of 
these four outcomes, which one depends on the specific values of the 
variables for each case. However, from the algebraic solution it seems 
that and are more likely to occur than the other two.  SPC ;− NPC ;−
No matter what, the strategic form could be reduced to figure x.x where 
each player could choose between two rational strategies. 
 
 R  
Strategies  )(SSettle  )(NsettleNot  
 
 
)(, PCpanelComplain − ( )dncrdnc −+−−− ; ( )xdpcrxdpc −−− ;C  
( )r;0 ( )r;0)(LgoLet    
5.3.6 What if incomplete information? 
Is it realistic to believe that this kind of game really has complete 
information? Does the model alter – and if so how – if we relax this 
assumption?  
It actually does not seem completely unreasonable that andC R would 
have exactly the same information (on the assumption that they make the 
same estimates for andp x ) but if something should not be known by all 
parties at the start of the game it should be the values of r and c . It could be 
difficult to estimate exactly how a certain measure affects another country 
(and it is not sure that they would tell you if you asked). However, according 
to the decisions summary above, r does not influence any choice, only c does. 
Hence, it does not matter whether knowsC r or not but the value of c is 
important for every decision. But even ifc is private information at the 
start of the game, he cannot pass the consultation phase (where accepts any 
offer where
sC '
C
dxdpccn −+−< R) without revealing it to . Thus, after the 
second node, all information will be shared, and as the first node only 
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 concernsC (who has complete information), the unknown does not matter 
either. 
c
Hence, if andp x are assumed to be accurately estimated, complete or 
incomplete information would not matter. However, if the parties would 
make diverging estimates of andp x , it would have implications for the 
decision-making process. Then, the outcome abolished above of neither a 
settlement nor a panel would become rationally possible. Because the 
implications of the Rubinstein Bargaining Model would no longer 
apply, could refuse a settlement thatC had expectedR R to accept. 
ThenC could – unexpectedly – end up at the panel choice node where it now 
seems more rational to let it all go than to continue with the case. 
5.4 What happens when a panel report is released? 
When a panel report is released the disputing parties finally find out if the 
case is good or bad. As mentioned above, a case cannot be denoted good or 
bad only by looking at the panel’s report but it is nevertheless a much better 
indication than the estimated probability that the players use until then. But 
how do the parties use this new information to adjust their strategies? These 
strategies are until then built on estimated utility functions which now could 
be updated and diversified, and as rational players who want to maximize 
their utility andC should do this. R
RIf, as is mostly the case, the complaint is approved finds himself in an 
uncomfortable situation. He has apparently chosen not to settle because he 
believed he had a good chance to win but now the opposite seems more 
likely. The chance that the Appellate Body would reject the panel’s 
judgement is r which give a rationalp R two utility functions to rank (see 
figure 1). Either he prefers  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) (
 
 
or u  (to not comply is not a rational option).  ( ) dcr
)
dccpr
dpcprpdcrdprpdcrpdrpappeal
r
rrrrrrr
3
333313
−−+
u +−×= − × − − = − + − +−− + =
=
comply 2−−=
As r statistically is very smallp R%)7( must either have very good reasons to 
believe it to be bigger in his situation or, the value of c  must be very big in 
order to make R take the risk to appeal. 
As seen in figure 1, can only wait while firstC R and then maybe the 
Appellate Body make the decisions. Depending on the outcome, he could 
then either enjoy  compliance, accept a defeat or start retaliating, neither 
action demanding any difficult decision-making. 
sR'
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 If, on the other hand, the complaint is dismissed by the panel the tables 
are turned. can then choose between C( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) dcpdpddpcpdpdcpappealu rrrrrr 3333313 −=+−−=−×−+−×=
and . ( ) dappealnotu 2_ −=
Even if r statistically tends to be bigger for than forp C R%)27( ,C  still needs 
good reason if he should appeal. 
 
Apparently, according to the model there is not much to do after a panel 
report is released, most of the time the parties should only accept the 
judgement. The most important decisions are undeniably made before the 
establishment of a panel. 
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 6 Implications of the model 
First of all, the costs that are associated with starting a dispute seem 
crucial. If it would not be for these costs  there would exist no rational 
economic reason for not starting a dispute as every complainant always could 
walk out with at least as much as he walked in with. As the DSM works now, 
C needs to expect that at least his dispute costs will be covered before he 
makes a formal complain. And these costs are not trivial, Bown – Hoekman 
(2005) have estimated these to be at least 500 000 USD per turn. Every time 
the economic losses of R’s illicit measure are much higher than the dispute 
costs it should nonetheless be fruitful to complain.  
)(d
These findings imply that disputes concerning large amounts of money 
are more valuable to complain about. As the sums at stake generally are 
bigger in the developed world than in the developing, this implies that there 
should be started more disputes in the former than the latter. This implication 
actually corresponds with the findings of table 3. 
Even if a developing country could afford a shorter process, the risk that it 
may last several rounds could deter it from filing. Thus, it would be in the 
interest of a developed country to act as hard as possible against developing 
complainants as it would deter potential future developing complainants to 
file at all. According to table 7, the number of settled conflicts is the lowest 
whenC is a developing country and R a developed, thus it confirms the 
model’s implication. 
The above findings also imply that (according to table 4) the most 
valuable cases for the member states concern manufactures, agricultural 
products and horizontal issues while natural resources and services are of less 
value. This does not seem to correspond as good with reality and the disparity 
probably need other explanations. 
The next crucial variable in the model is as always affects initial 
choice to file or not (either directly in
sC 'p pc
0>− xdpc , or indirectly as choice 
whether to settle or not depends on ). This means that most filed measures 
should be very probable to be illicit as the higher risk to lose otherwise would 
make it unattractive. According to table 8, almost 80% of the complaints were 
approved, thus confirming the model’s implication. 
sR'
pc
But what about the possible outcome of neither a settlement nor a panel? 
With the assumptions made (including complete information), this outcome 
seems completely irrational but nonetheless more than one third of the cases 
end up here according to table 5. The complete information model fails to 
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 explain this behaviour, if it was only cases whereC was developing 
and R developed it could be explained by the deterrence factor described 
above but according to table 7 it is a common outcome irrespective of parties. 
With incomplete information one other explanation is added: if andC R  has 
different conceptions of the two estimated variables, x and ,C  may have 
misjudged interest in reaching a settlement. But it seems to be much more 
common in reality than in the model. 
p
sR'
It is neither possible to explain the behaviour of some complainants in 
when choosing between retaliation and implementation appeal, those who 
have chosen the latter in table 12 seem to have acted irrational. 
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 7 Conclusions 
The game theoretic model for WTO member states’ behaviour in the DSM 
outlined in this thesis is in many ways a very unrealistic one. For example, it 
only treats the direct costs and benefits of a perceived illicit measure while 
there exists an infinite number of different indirect utilities in the real world. 
Furthermore, it has a bias towards economical factors as the utilities used 
more or less corresponds to economic values (of course, for example c could 
signify both the strictly economical loss for as well as other experienced, 
non economical, costs but to the biggest part it is the economical reasons that 
have been evaluated). Nevertheless, there exist a rather good correlation 
between what the model implies and what the reality looks like. Except a few 
drawbacks concerning the heavy use of a strategy that results in neither a 
settlement nor a panel and the choice of implementation appeal instead of 
retaliation. However possible explanations to these seemingly irrational 
strategies may be found in related or future research. If the model were 
expanded to include more features those strategies could become rational. 
However, too many aspects added reduce the predictive capacity of game 
theory as each case then will have a whole lot of variables that must be 
estimated. One single mistake during that procedure would ruin the 
predictability. What is gained in accuracy is consequently lost in 
predictability. Hence it is uncertain that a more thorough elaborated model 
would have generated any better results. 
C
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 Appendix A 
Nash equilibriums 
 
1. Complain, no panel; Settle (C-N; S) - False ( ) ( ) dncdncSPCPSNCP CC −−≥−−⇒−≥− ;;  (true) ( ) ( ) 0;; ≥−−⇒≥− dncSLPSNCP CC   (true) ( ) ( ) drdncrNNCPSNCP RR −≥−+−⇒−≥− ;;  (true) 
 
Each equation is true on its own but all three equations cannot exist at the 
same time as we then would get the expression: ( )d≥0  
which is false as . Thus, this outcome cannot be a Nash Equilibrium. 0>d
 
 
2. Complain, no panel; Not Settle (C-N; N) - False ( ) ( ) xdpcdNPCPNNCP CC −≥−⇒−≥− ;;   (true) ( ) ( ) 0;; ≥−⇒≥− dNLPNNCP CC   (false) ( ) ( ) dncrdrSNCPNNCP RR −+−≥−⇒−≥− ;;  (true) 
 
As equation number two is false in itself (as ) this outcome cannot be a 
Nash Equilibrium. 
0>d
 
 
3. Complain, panel; Settle (C-P; S) - True ( ) ( ) dncdncSNCPSPCP CC −−≥−−⇒−≥− ;;  (true) ( ) ( ) 0;; ≥−−⇒≥− dncSLPSPCP CC   (true) ( ) ( ) xdpcrdncrNPCPSPCP RR −−≥−+−⇒−≥− ;;  (true) 
 
Each equation is true on its own and all three can exist at the same time. 
Thus, this outcome can be a Nash Equilibrium.  
 
 
4. Complain, panel; Not settle (C-P; N) - True ( ) ( ) dxdpcNNCPNPCP CC −≥−⇒−≥− ;;   (true) ( ) ( ) 0;; ≥−⇒≥− xdpcNLPNPCP CC   (true) ( ) ( ) dncrxdpcrSPCPNPCP RR −+−≥−−⇒−≥− ;;  (true) 
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 Each equation is true on its own and all three can exist at the same time. 
Thus, this outcome can be a Nash Equilibrium.  
 
 
5. Let go; Settle (L; S) - True ( ) ( ) dncSNCPSLP CC −−≥⇒−≥ 0;;   (true) ( ) ( ) dncSPCPSLP CC −−≥⇒−≥ 0;;   (true) ( ) ( ) rrNLPSLP RR ≥⇒≥ ;;    (true) 
 
Each equation is true on its own and all three can exist at the same time. 
Thus, this outcome can be a Nash Equilibrium.  
 
 
6. Let go; Not settle (L; N) - True ( ) ( ) dNNCPNLP CC −≥⇒−≥ 0;;   (true) ( ) ( ) xdpcNPCPNLP CC −≥⇒−≥ 0;;   (true) ( ) ( ) rrSLPNLP RR ≥⇒≥ ;;    (true) 
 
Each equation is true on its own and all three can exist at the same time. 
Thus, this outcome can be a Nash Equilibrium.  
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